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ABSTRACT
Large solar explosions are responsible for space weather that can impact technological infrastructure on and
around Earth. Here, we apply a retrospective cohort exposure analysis to quantify the impacts of geomagnetic
activity on the U.S. electric power grid for the period from 1992 through 2010. We find, with more than 3σ
significance, that approximately 4% of the disturbances in the U.S. power grid reported to the U.S. Department
of Energy are attributable to strong geomagnetic activity and its associated geomagnetically induced currents.
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1. Introduction
Explosions powered by the Sun’s magnetic field
(“flares” and “coronal mass ejections” or CMEs)
are among the principal causes of “space weather”
(see, e.g., Space Studies Board, 2008). These elec-
tromagnetic storms can affect our technological
infrastructure in space, interfere with communi-
cations and GPS signals, and couple through the
geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) into the
large-scale high-voltage electric grid (see, e.g.,
Boteler et al., 1998; Boteler and Jansen van Beek,
1999; Gaunt and Coetzee, 2007). Despite the known
impact of large space weather events on the electrical
power grid (see, e.g., Space Studies Board, 2008;
FEMA, 2010; Kappenman, 2010; Hapgood, 2011;
JASON, 2011) - including the 1989 Hydro-Que´bec
blackout (Be´land and Small, 2004) - relatively
few studies of the general correlation are avail-
able; case studies of individual events (such as by
Kappenman et al., 1997; Kappenman, 2005) and
compilations of events for comparison with the solar
cycle (for example by Boteler et al., 1998) generally
focus on large storms and large impacts.
There is a recognized hazard of catastrophic out-
ages that may be caused by geomagnetic super-
storms larger than what we have experienced in
recent decades (Space Studies Board, 2008; FEMA,
2010; Kappenman, 2010; Hapgood, 2012). Such su-
perstorms may cause trillions of dollars of dam-
age (Space Studies Board, 2008), although it is ac-
knowledged that such estimates are rather uncer-
tain (JASON, 2011). Other studies assessing the eco-
nomic impact on a statistical basis find significant
correlations between magnetometer data, GICs, elec-
tric grid effects, and the conditions of the electric
power grid market (Forbes and St. Cyr, 2004, 2008,
2010). These correlations are associated with mar-
ket price variations on the order of a few percent
(Forbes and St. Cyr, 2004).
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The main cause of GICs is the interaction of the
geomagnetic field with the magnetic field carried
within CMEs and the surrounding background mag-
netized solar wind that is modulated by them. With
speeds of 400 − 2500 km/s, it takes some 1 − 4 d
for CMEs to propagate from the Sun to the Earth,
with a typical transit time of 2 − 3 d. Correlations
between the strength of CMEs, and the magnitude
of their impact in geospace continue to be studied,
both observationally and in numerical analyses (e.g.,
Newell et al., 2007; Schrijver, 2009; Andreeova et al.,
2011). A multitude of factors may play a role, includ-
ing properties of the solar events themselves and of
the solar wind through which the events travel to Earth
(e.g., Russell and McPherron, 1973; Pulkkinen, 2007;
Schrijver and Siscoe, 2010). Furthermore, the magni-
tude of GICs depends on the location and time of day
(through the geomagnetic position relative to the Sun-
Earth line) at impact, on the structure of the magnetic
field within the CME as that field interacts with the
magnetic field of the Earth during the CME’s passage
(thereby inducing electric fields in the Earth depen-
dent on the direction and the rate of change of the
CME magnetic field), on the ground conductivities in
a wide area around any particular site for depths from
ground level down to in excess of 100 km, and on the
evolving architecture of the electric power grid into
which the induced electric field couples.
Within the electric power system, GICs can cause
transformers to operate in their nonlinear saturation
range during half of the AC cycle. The consequences
of half-cycle saturation include distortions of the volt-
age pattern (reflected in the existence of harmon-
ics to the primary frequency), heating within the
transformers, or voltage-to-current phase shifts ex-
pressed as reactive power consumption in the sys-
tem (see, e.g., Lauby et al., 2013, in these proceed-
ings). The detection of harmonics or of strong GICs
may cause protective systems to trip, taking one or
more transformers off line to protect them from se-
vere damage. The implementation of such protec-
tive measures changes the grid’s overall configuration
as well as the regional balance between power gen-
eration and use which, in turn, can lead to power-
quality variations in the form of voltage and fre-
quency swings (causing, for example, the 1989 Hydro
Que´bec blackout, e.g., Boteler, 2001). Moreover, the
detection of GICs may cause system operators to
change the operational standards to project the over-
all system from damage, for example by chang-
ing the transfer limits for power that may be trans-
ported between segments of a grid (from where sur-
plus power is more economically available to regions
where the demand is highest) to create a buffer in-
terval to keep GICs from pushing transformers into
their nonlinear range (as is the standard “GMD pro-
cedure” during strong GIC events for the PJM re-
gional transmission operator on the east coast of
the US, see PJM State and Member Training Dept.,
2010). Strong GICs can result in dissipative heating
within the transformers which may lead to their fail-
ure, either within minutes or because of cumulative
damage done over the life time of the transformer
(e.g., Gaunt, 2013, in these proceedings).
The strengths of GICs scale with the rate of change
of the geomagnetic field. As our study addresses the
reliability of the U.S. power grid, we chose to use
a measure of geomagnetic variability derived from
geomagnetic measurements made around the cen-
tral latitudes of the U.S. We verified that the use
of a commonly-used metric for large-scale geomag-
netic variability, the Kp index, yields the same results
when allowing for the statistical uncertainties. We find
that even using criteria based directly on the occur-
rence of the solar events that ultimately drive space
weather yields the same results, so that our findings
are quite insensitive to the metric used to quantify
space weather conditions in which the U.S. power grid
operates.
2. Disturbances in the U.S. power grid
As input to this study we use a compilation of “system
disturbances” published annually by both the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC1:
available since 1992) and by the Office of Electricity
1 http://www.nerc.com
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Fig. 1. Monthly frequency of grid disturbances (black histogram) and its 12-month running average (dashed
gray line). Dates with (a) one of more M- or X-class flares, (b) one or more X-class flares, or (c) two or more
X-class flares are marked by (red) bars near the top of the diagram. The monthly count of M and X class
flares is shown inverted from the top by the blue line only to avoid confusing overlaps between this and the
rate of grid disturbances, while still being able to view the relative behavior in the peaks of each of the two
curves. The yearly sunspot number is overlaid as a (green) solid curve (divided by a factor of five for display
purposes).
Delivery and Energy Reliability of the Department of
Energy (DOE2; available since 2000). NERC com-
piles this information for an electric power market that
serves over 300 million people throughout the U.S.A.
and in Ontario and New Brunswick in Canada, jointly
delivering power through more than 340,000 km of
high-voltage transmission lines, linking 18,000 power
plants within the U.S. (JASON, 2011).
The reported disturbances include, among others,
“electric service interruptions, voltage reductions, acts
of sabotage, unusual occurrences that can affect the
reliability of the bulk electric systems, and fuel prob-
lems.” The NERC reporting changed from “selected
disturbances” to a more comprehensive listing starting
2 http://energy.gov/oe/office-electricity-delivery-and-energy-
reliability
in 2003 (following a grid collapse on August 14, 2003,
affecting almost 50 million customers). The DOE lists
add information for 2008, 2010, and 2011. To avoid
a strongly inhomogeneous data set, we exclude the
DOE data for 2011 because of a marked change in the
types of events being reported on; for example, there
are 79 events marked ’Vandalism’ in 2011, which is
300× the average rate for that class of event reported
in the 19 preceding years. We thus use the combined
disturbance reports3 4 for the 19-y period of 1992
through 2010.
We extracted the information on all 1216 distur-
bances listed in the NERC-DOE reports, including the
identified main cause, and the impact on power and
3 http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=5|66
4 http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417 annual summary.aspx
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number of customers affected (the latter two are of-
ten incompletely specified in the disturbance reports).
Hence, our master list of attributed “causes” includes
a variety of weather conditions (storms, ice, lightning,
etc.), operator errors, equipment failures, transmission
line faults, etc.
Figure 1 shows that the overall frequency of grid
disturbances exhibits a long-term increasing trend
(the grey dashed curve), modulated substantially on
shorter time scales (shown on a monthly basis by the
black histogram). The figure also shows the yearly-
averaged sunspot number (green curve) that is - as ex-
pected - clearly correlated with flare frequency (blue
line; shown inverted simply to avoid too much over-
lap with the grid-disturbance frequency). No obvi-
ous correlation between solar flaring activity and grid-
disturbance frequency stands out (the peaks in the
blue and black curves do not align, nor do the dotted
vertical lines - dates of the most severe solar activ-
ity with at least two X-class flares - point to particu-
larly enhanced grid-disturbance frequencies), consis-
tent with our conclusions below that the effects are
relatively weak, albeit significant.
3. Geomagnetic activity and electric
power grid disturbances
As no direct attributions to space weather conditions
have been made for the events from the NERC-DOE
reports studied here, we anticipate at most a weak
effect by space weather on the power grid that may
be strongly modulated by other processes affecting
the grid’s condition. Given enough independent con-
trolling variables (such as the evolving connectivities
within the power grid, the patterns of weather con-
ditions, and the grid loads and their changes with
time around the country), one might develop a multi-
variate dependent variable model. However, insuffi-
cient information is available to us at present: the
detailed supply, demand, and weather conditions are
not included in the NERC/DOE reports, and no in-
formation is available on the probability that no re-
portable grid disturbances ensued from other operator
errors, cases of vandalism, or cyber attacks, for exam-
ple. Moreover, as we find below that only a few dozen
disturbances in the sample of over 1,000 reported dis-
turbances are attributable to enhanced space weather,
we cannot study separate grid areas while maintain-
ing statistical significance of the results. Such regional
studies are natural follow-up studies of this work, and
those can focus not on the statistical demonstration
of susceptibility, as we do here, but on the detailed
physics of the electromagnetic coupling of GICs into
the power grid.
The power grid is generally operated in a state
with enough power being generated to meet customer
demand, with only a relatively small overcapacity –
the “reserve margin” – available to accommodate for
rapid changes in demand or to compensate for “con-
tingency events”, i.e., external perturbations of the
grid, such as lightning strikes and other weather con-
ditions, or internal events, such as component fail-
ures. Thus, whereas one might argue that, for exam-
ple, disturbances attributed to a lightning strike or to
an ice storm or to a heat wave might need to be re-
moved from the list of disturbances in a study looking
to quantify the potential effects of space weather, it
may well be that the grid disturbance ensued only be-
cause other factors, possibly including space weather,
put the system in a state of increased susceptibility.
Taking this perspective, the only disturbances that one
might exclude a priori are those that are attributed to
planned maintenance (provided these did not cause
unforeseen disturbances elsewhere) or to fuel short-
ages at the generating plants. Even cases flagged as
“operator errors” should not be excluded a priori be-
cause the reports do not specify if the operators were
responding to changing grid conditions or merely to a
truly local need to change the operation of a grid seg-
ment. Even “vandalism” might be more or less effec-
tive in causing a grid disturbance depending on system
load and on the conditions of the geomagnetic field. In
view of the low numbers of events in the above sets,
and as we do not wish to inadvertently introduce bi-
ases in the process, we elected to work with the com-
plete set of reported grid disturbances.
Our study thus applies a standard method as used
in, e.g., epidemiology where it would be described as
4
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as a retrospective cohort exposure study with tightly
matched controls (see, e.g., Schulz and Grimes, 2002,
on cohort vs. case-control studies). In our case, the
cohort under study is the set of all dates from 1992
through 2010. For all elements of that set, we study
the ”exposure” of the U.S. electric power grid to geo-
magnetic activity in excess of a specified threshold (in
fact, three distinct thresholds based on percentiles of
the distribution of geomagnetic-activity values, as de-
fined below) and count the number of power-grid dis-
turbances on such dates. The results of that are then
compared to two control samples with distinctly dif-
ferent levels of “exposure”, namely one with average
exposure levels and another - the reference control
sample - with low exposure levels.
As the grid, its load, and its operating procedures
change over time, we need to devise a test that com-
pares grid disturbance frequencies on days of elevated
geomagnetic activity to a control sample of days of
low geomagnetic activity but with all other conditions
being similar. We control against effects of contin-
uously varying confounders that are associated with
the evolution of the grid’s infrastructure and operat-
ing rules over time by sample matching, specifically
by ensuring time comparability of the ”exposed” and
control samples (e.g., Wacholder et al., 1992, and ref-
erences therein): we form two control samples with
matched frequencies by selecting dates near each of
the dates of high ”exposure” subject only to a crite-
rion about their exposure levels. The selection of two
control samples, rather than only one, provides addi-
tional insight into the effects at three different levels
of exposure that can be compared within each selected
exposure percentile, but we caution against compari-
son across percentiles because of the changes in grid
operating conditions with time.
In the definition of our control samples, we assume
that weather conditions, fuel prices, and vandalism,
for example, are not correlated with conditions on the
Sun and in geospace within the 50-day sample match-
ing windows (described below), but that these and
other conditions form a background that varies inde-
pendently of solar and space weather. In view of the
above, we adopt the following avenue of research: we
compare the frequency of grid disturbances under se-
vere space weather conditions with that under light
space-weather conditions, with the grid in otherwise
similar conditions. The second group is the control
group containing grid disturbances that are much less,
if not entirely unaffected by space weather. The con-
trast between these two samples enables us to estimate
the attributable risk, i.e., the impact of geomagnetic
disturbances associated with space weather.
To characterize the geomagnetic activity that may
couple into the U.S. power grid, we use data from the
Boulder (BOU) and Fredericksburg (FRD) stations5.
With the minute-by-minute data in hand, we compute
the maximum value of |dB/dt| for 30-min. intervals,
for the average of the two stations that are located
along the central latitudinal axis of the U.S., some-
what emphasizing the eastern U.S. as do the grid and
population that uses that.
In Table 1, we list the average grid disturbance
rates, ga, for dates corresponding to the top p = 2, 5,
and 10 percentiles of geomagnetic activity, respec-
tively. These numbers need to be compared to dis-
turbance rates in the absence of strong geomagnetic
activity. In order to ensure that the grid and its load
are in a statistically comparable state, we look at con-
ditions in 50-d windows centered on dates with high
|dB/dt(30m)|. Selecting a random date within these
windows, but more than 5 d away from the reference
dates, yields the disturbance rates gr. These are lower
than the rates ga for days of high geomagnetic activity,
but this selection criterion does not, of course, avoid
dates of significant geomagnetic activity. Hence, for a
second control sample we select dates for the last day
of the 3-d interval of the lowest average |dB/dt(30m)|
within each of the 50-d intervals. This yields distur-
bance rates gi for geomagnetically inactive days.
We note that for each of the percentile (p) levels,
we find ga > gr > gi, i.e., the disturbance frequency
is highest within geomagnetically active days, lower
for a randomly sampled nearby day, and lowest when
geomagnetic activity is lowest. We caution that the
values of ga,r,i for different p levels are not directly
5 http://ottawa.intermagnet.org/apps/dl data def e.php
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Table 1. Average daily frequency of grid disturbances for three distinct selection criteria: ga within the day of
high geomagnetic activity as measured by |dB/dt|(30m); gi for a day ending a 3-day period with the lowest
average |dB/dt(30m)| within 25 days of a day with high |dB/dt(30m)|; gr for a day selected at random between
5 and 50 days before or after high |dB/dt(30m)|. The conditional criterion for days with high |dB/dt(30m)|
is defined in the first column for each of the three rows. The final column shows the total number of dates,
Nd with high |dB/dt(30m)| corresponding to the 2, 5, and 10 percentile levels. Uncertainties and subsampling
criteria are as defined in Table 2.
Selection criterion for ga [enhanced gi [low gr [nearby Nd
reference dates geomagn. act.] nearby geomagn. act.] random date]
All disturbances (1216 cases)
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 36.1 0.230 ± 0.041 0.058 ± 0.020 0.136 ± 0.031 139
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 24.5 0.184 ± 0.023 0.107 ± 0.018 0.143 ± 0.023 347
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 18.5 0.167 ± 0.016 0.089 ± 0.012 0.147 ± 0.016 694
WET: Attributed to weather/external/technical causes (743 cases)
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 36.1 0.137 ± 0.031 0.043 ± 0.018 0.070 ± 0.024
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 24.5 0.115 ± 0.018 0.055 ± 0.013 0.077 ± 0.016
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 18.5 0.099 ± 0.011 0.050 ± 0.009 0.080 ± 0.010
U: Unclear/unknown attribution (473 cases)
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 36.1 0.094 ± 0.026 0.014 ± 0.010 0.066 ± 0.025
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 24.5 0.069 ± 0.010 0.052 ± 0.012 0.066 ± 0.017
|dB/dt(30m)| ≥ 18.5 0.068 ± 0.010 0.039 ± 0.007 0.068 ± 0.013
comparable, because the coverage throughout the full
sample period for each of these sets is different, and
thus sensitive to long-term trends in grid, weather, and
solar cycle.
For each value of the percentiles, p, we can es-
timate the number of grid disturbances in excess of
those occurring in conditions of low geomagnetic ac-
tivity by computing Np = (ga − gi)(p/100)nd (where
nd is the number of days in our 19-y study inter-
val): Np = 24 ± 6, 27 ± 10, 54 ± 13, respectively, for
p = 2, 5, 10. For higher p values, more disturbances
may be associated with geomagnetic activity, but the
uncertainties on the values of Nd rapidly increase (for
p = 25, for example, the uncertainty in N25 embraces
N10 within one standard deviation), so that with the
present data, we leave it at our finding that at least
N10 ≈ 50 disturbances are attributable to enhanced
geomagnetic activity during the period of our study.
In order to assess whether our choice of metric for
geomagnetic variability would significantly bias the
results, we repeated our analysis for another com-
monly used index to characterize the interaction of
the geomagnetic field with the variable solar wind,
namely the Kp index. Kp is measured in sub-auroral
mid-latitude stations characteristic of activity in cen-
tral regions of Europe and the northern US, which is
to be contrasted to the higher latitudes used for the AE
index or the more global distribution of stations used
for the Dst index. The Kp index is determined from
the variability of the Earth’s magnetic field, as mea-
sured by a network of ground-based magnetometers,
on a 3-h basis, expressed relative to quiet-day variabil-
ity on a scale from 0 to 9. Analyzing daily averages of
Kp, we find results that are statistically consistent with
those in Table 1 based on |dB/dt(30m)|; we omit that
table here for brevity.
As a final test, we compare the compiled data
base on disturbances in the electric power grid to
the catalog of solar flares maintained by NOAA, se-
lecting only large flares of GOES classes M and X
(based on the logarithmic 1 − 8Å peak brightness,
such that an X1 flare is ten times brighter than an
6
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Table 2. Average daily frequency of grid disturbances for three distinct selection criteria: fa from 2 to 5 days
after a major flare; fi for inactive intervals, i.e., 4-d intervals following the first 7-d intervals of no M or X
flaring prior to dates with major flaring; fr for a randomly-selected 4-d interval between 5 and 50 days before
or after ’major flaring’. The conditional criterion for days with ’major flaring’ is defined in the first column
for each of the three rows. The final two columns show the total number of dates, Nd, and the total number of
flares on such dates, N f . Uncertainties in fa and fi assume Poisson statistics; for fr the standard deviation of a
sample of 100 random realizations is given. Data are shown for all grid disturbances (top), for grid disturbances
attributed to weather, technical or external causes (center), and for the complementary set of grid disturbances
of unclear attribution (bottom).
Selection criterion for fa [2-5d after fi [nearby interval, fr [random Nd N f
reference dates M/X flaring] without M/X flaring] nearby date]
All disturbances (1216 cases)
Multiple X flares 0.328 ± 0.072 0.063 ± 0.031 0.210 ± 0.071 16 36
At least one X flare 0.179 ± 0.020 0.116 ± 0.015 0.154 ± 0.022 116 136
At least one M or X flare 0.151 ± 0.006 0.126 ± 0.005 0.148 ± 0.007 1054 1897
WET: Attributed to weather/external/technical causes (743 cases)
Multiple X flares 0.140 ± 0.047 0.031 ± 0.022 0.120 ± 0.056
At least one X flare 0.071 ± 0.012 0.050 ± 0.010 0.085 ± 0.017
At least one M or X flare 0.077 ± 0.004 0.068 ± 0.004 0.083± 0.005
U: Unclear/unknown attribution (473 cases)
Multiple X flares 0.188 ± 0.054 0.031 ± 0.022 0.090 ± 0.040
At least one X flare 0.108 ± 0.015 0.067 ± 0.012 0.067 ± 0.011
At least one M or X flare 0.074 ± 0.004 0.058 ± 0.004 0.064 ± 0.004
M1 flare, and close to ten times more energetic over-
all (Veronig et al., 2002)). For the period 1992-2010
there were 1897 M- and X-class flares on 1054 dis-
tinct dates. Nearly half of all M-class flares and over
90% of X-class flares are associated with CMEs (see
the review by Schrijver, 2009, and references therein)
and thus most such flares affect the dynamics of the
heliospheric field, and thereby can couple into the ge-
omagnetic field if directed towards the Earth.
We determined the grid disturbance frequencies
fa,i,r using three distinct selection criteria: (1) fa for
intervals 2-5 d after major solar flaring (allowing for
a range of CME propagation times and a 1 − 2 d
period of ensuing geomagnetic activity as the CME
passes Earth), (2) fr for 4-d intervals randomly se-
lected within 50 d of major solar flaring (in order to re-
main reasonably within similar conditions for the grid
otherwise) but not within 5 d of that flaring, and (3) fi
for the first 4-d intervals prior to the selected reference
dates of major solar flaring that end 7-d intervals of no
major solar flaring, thus selecting periods of relatively
quiescent conditions in heliosphere and geospace.
When selecting dates for all X- or M-class flares,
Table 2 shows fa = 0.151±0.006 disturbances/day and
fi = 0.126±0.005 (with the uncertainties based on the
numbers of events and assuming Poisson statistics).
We thus find a substantial increase in the frequency
of grid disturbances in the days following major flar-
ing relative to quiescent intervals, at a significance of
about 4.5σ.
Note that fr is not significantly different from fa:
with 1054 days of X or M flaring mostly concentrated
around cycle maximum (see Fig. 1), randomly select-
ing a date within 50 d from a flare frequently results in
a date only days after another such major flare. When
we select only days with at least one X-class flare, the
chance of such overlaps is lowered: we see that in this
case fa exceeds fr by about 2σ, while fa exceeds fi
7
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Fig. 2. Superposed epoch statistics of U.S. power grid disturbances for days of geomagnetic activity as
measured by the maximum dB/dt in 30-min. intervals, averaged for the U.S. BOU and FRD stations
(〈|dB/dt(30m)|〉) for the top 2, 5, and 10 percent of dates between 1992 and 2010, respectively. In each panel,
the horizontal grey line and the dashed lines adjacent to it show the disturbance rates under quiescent space-
weather conditions (i.e., the values of gi, see Sect. 3 and Table 1) and the associated standard deviations,
respectively.
by 3.6σ. Dates with more than one X flare show an
even more pronounced difference, but the sample is
relatively small and the uncertainties correspondingly
larger.
In order to estimate the total number N⊙ of grid dis-
turbances added to the background grid variability by
solar activity, we multiply fa − fi by the number of
independent dates found within the set of 4-d peri-
ods 2 d after major flaring, yielding N⊙ = 50 ± 16,
or 4.1 ± 1.3% of all disturbances.
The study methodology applied above enforces a
strict exclusion of information bias in creating the
sample and its controls by ignoring the stated reason
for a power grid disturbance in the reports. This is ef-
fective in eliminating confounders related to the re-
porting completeness and accuracy, and allows us to
quantify the impact of a single variable among all pos-
sible impacts on the US power grid, namely the grid’s
”exposure” to geomagnetic activity (see, e.g., Grimes
and Schulz, 2005, on selection biases in samples and
their controls, specifically their example on pp. 1429-
1430). It is instructive, however, to see the impact of
introducing a selection bias by a coarse separation of
identified causes.
Tables 1 and 2 show the grid disturbance frequen-
cies when separating the disturbances into two broad
categories. One category (WET) contains clear attri-
butions to weather (including hot and cold weather,
wind, ice, and lightning; 637 entries), external factors
(fires, sabotage, earthquakes, collisions, etc.; 63), and
technical issues (fuel shortages, maintenance, etc.; 43
entries). The complementary list (U, with 473 en-
tries) shows causes such as ’line fault’, ’operator er-
ror’, ’public appeal’, ’voltage reduction’, ’load shed’,
’equipment failure’, etc., for which no clear corre-
lation with weather, external, or technical issues is
8
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listed. The contrasts between ga and gi for days with
geomagnetic activity in the top percentiles for the both
types of events are statistically comparable to those
of the full sample. The same is true for the contrast
between the conditional grid-disturbance frequencies
given flare activity, i.e., fa/ fi for high, medium, and
moderate flaring activity. We conclude from this ex-
periment that the susceptibility of the US power grid
appears to be statistically similar to geomagnetic ac-
tivity for the two classes of causes, and that our find-
ings would thus have been identical had we focused
only on those disturbances for which the identified
cause is clearly proximate (as follows from the exam-
ples of included causes in group U given above).
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are a direct demon-
stration of the statistically significant impact of geo-
magnetic activity on the US power grid. We add to
that the simple visualization in Figure 2 which em-
phasizes this impact in a slightly different manner. As
the space-weather effects on the U.S. power grid over
our 19-y interval are relatively weak, we use a super-
posed epoch analysis to visualize the magnitude of
the effects. Figure 2 shows the average grid distur-
bance frequencies for days with geomagnetic activ-
ity, as measured by |dB/dt(30m)|, in the top 2, 5, and
10 percentiles in panels a, b, and c, respectively, for
4-week periods centered on those most active dates.
There clearly is a peak on the central dates relative
to their surrounding periods, revealing a dependence
of the U.S. power grid reliability on space-weather
conditions. Often, solar active regions exhibit series
of flaring and coronal mass ejections over periods of
multiple days, sometimes up to a full two weeks as a
flare-productive region crosses the disk. Hence, for a
comparison of the geomagnetically active dates with a
reference date of low geomagnetic activity, the curves
shown in Fig. 2 do not provide suitable information
to set a baseline level for grid disturbances in periods
of low geomagnetic activity; that baseline level was
discussed above and presented in the Tables.
In conclusion, we find a statistically significant en-
hancement in the frequency of power grid distur-
bances on days of high geomagnetic activity, regard-
less of which measure for geomagnetic activity we
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Fig. 3. Graphical rendition of the grid disturbance
rates under different levels of geomagnetic activity, as
listed in Table 1. The three columns show the results
for geomagnetic activity in the 10th, 5th, and 2nd up-
per percentiles of geomagnetic activity as measured
by |dB/dt(30m)|, respectively. The excess in event fre-
quency on geomagnetically active days compared to
nearby inactive days is shown by dark diagonal shad-
ing.
use: a metric for 30-min. variability characteristic of
the central U.S.A. (for which the results from Table 1
are shown graphically in Fig. 3), a metric for the 3-
h (Kp) variability for high latitudes around the globe,
or when looking at intervals following days of ma-
jor solar flaring. This enhancement means that at least
≈ 4% of reported grid disturbances are attributable
in whole or in part to enhanced geomagnetic activ-
ity. We note that although significant, the fraction of
grid disturbances that we find attributable to GIC ef-
fects is relatively small, so that the overall number
of disturbances attributable to space weather is small
even during periods of severe solar activity: even on
days with the most extreme geomagnetic activity, only
≈ ((0.23 ± 0.04) − (0.06 ± 0.02)) = 0.17 ± 0.05 dis-
turbances per day would expected in association with
severe space weather (using numbers from Table 1).
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4. Discussion
We perform a retrospective cohort study to quantify
the susceptibility of the US power grid to disturbances
attributable (at least in part) to geomagnetic activ-
ity. The results of such a study can be expressed in
a simple contingency table, of which Tables 1 and 2
are variants. Alternatively, it could be expressed as
odds ratios and their confidence intervals (e.g., Morris
and Gardner, 1988) or in terms of chi square, both of
which can be derived from the numbers in Tables 1
and 2. Such numbers convey the same message as the
combined contingency Tables 1 and 2: the impact of
the ”exposure” is statistically significant to more than
the 3-sigma level, i.e., the null hypothesis that the US
power grid is insensitive to space weather is rejected
with more than 0.975 (or 32 in 33) probability.
Except in rare cases, solar energetic events and re-
sulting geomagnetic activity are not presently recog-
nized as contributing to power grid disturbances. In
fact, no grid disturbance was thus attributed over the
19-y period studied, either as primary cause or as con-
tributing factor, in the NERC-DOE reports. This is to
be contrasted to our finding (significant in excess of 4
standard deviations) that over the 19-y period of our
study, ≈ 50 grid disturbances reported to NERC and
DOE had strong geomagnetic and solar activity as a
contributing factor.
The present lack of recognition of geomagnetic ac-
tivity as a contributing agent in grid disturbances may
reflect that, in contrast to extreme storms, moderate
to severe space weather conditions do not by them-
selves cause such disturbances but instead are one fac-
tor among all others to which the electric power grid is
susceptable. These other perturbations may be identi-
fied as the cause of the disturbance, but our study leads
us to conclude that sometimes geomagnetic activity is
a contributing factor. One may think of parallels such
as the activity of skiers that contributes to the trigger-
ing of avalanches particularly if conditions of snowfall
and weather are right; or one may consider the effect
of being engaged in cell phone calls on the likelihood
of vehicular accidents in demanding traffic conditions.
We conjecture that in the grid disturbances that we
find to be influenced by geomagnetic activity and their
induced currents, this activity may be the equivalent of
the presence of a skier or of being on the phone in the
above analogies. The U.S. power grid is, after all, a
highly complex coupled system in which initially lo-
calized problems can cascade into disturbances of any
size (characterized on the large end of the spectrum
by a scale-free power-law distribution typical of non-
linear systems (Carreras et al., 2003; Talukdar et al.,
2003)), compounded by the fact that GICs induced by
space weather extend over a large fraction of the foot-
print of the U.S. electric power grid and thus can have
effects in various locations simultaneously.
The apparent correlation of electric power grid dis-
turbances with pronounced solar and geomagnetic ac-
tivity warrants the investigation and implementation
of mitigation strategies and the support of a space
weather research program as well the continued devel-
opment of a space weather forecasting system. Such
an investment would also help us to better under-
stand what protection society would need if faced with
more severe space weather than experienced in recent
decades, or from more extensive cascading effects in
our ever-more coupled technological infrastructure.
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